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the common usage of the word "theft" prevails in an insurance
case.

21

There is a conflict among the cases as to whether a "theft" provision covers the case where the insured is induced to part with
possession of his automobile by fraud," but recovery is usually
allowed where the theft statutes include taking by fraud. It does
seem desirable to have a uniformity with criminal court decisions
defining the crime on which the insurance claim is based.
Melvin R. Stidham.

LABOR LAW
PEACEFUL PICKETING -INCIDENTAL

HARM TO STRANGER

Arkansas. Missouri Pacific Ry v. United Brick and Clay Workers Union, Local No. 602,' involved the right of a stranger to a
labor dispute to enjoin picketing. Striking employees of the Acme
Brick Company had established picket lines at the highway leading to the Company's plant and at a point where the railway's
spur track leading to the brick plant crossed the highway. The
pickets at this latter point were intended to convey notice of the
strike to the railway's train crews on their way to the Acme plant.
The regular train crews refused to cross this picket line, and the
railway had to stop its trains at that point and put on special
crews to take its trains in and out of the plant. It was to enjoin
the maintenance of this picket line that the Missouri Pacific brought
suit.
The railway conceded the Union's right of peaceful picketing
but contended that the picketing in question was for an illegal
purpose and should be enjoined under the doctrine of the Giboney
case.' First, it was said that the picketing prevented the railway
21 Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins.
22 VANCE, INSURANCE (3d ed. 1951) § 199.
1

.-------- Ark........

2 Giboney

Co., 239 N. Y. 303, 146 N. E. 432 (1925).

, 238 S. W . 2d 945 (1951).

v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949).
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from complying with its statutory duty to provide equal service
to all shippers.' The court answered by saying that this was not
the purpose of the picketing but was merely an incidental result
thereof. Second, the railway relied on a statute making it a misdemeanor to do a willful act which stops or obstructs a railway
engine.4 The court pointed out that this statute was enacted in
1868, was aimed at physical obstructions or conduct endangering
lives and property, and was not applicable to a picket line. Third,
the railway said that since it alone was hampered by the picket
line, the conduct amounted to an unlawful secondary boycott. The
court held that even if a secondary boycott were unlawful in Arkansas, this picketing was primary, and the fact that the railroad
was the only one affected by it was immaterial since the strike
was not directed against it.
The dissenting opinion relied on the penal statute mentioned
and interpreted it not as a safety measure but as a guaranty of
free and uninterrupted flow of commerce. The Giboney case was
thought to be authority that an injunction could issue against
picketing which caused a violation of state law.
A recent Texas case presented a similar fact situation.' There
a striking union maintained a picket line at the railroad's spur
track leading into the picketed plant. A temporory injunction
issued against picketing within one hundred feet of the tracks
on the ground that such acts caused a secondary boycott in viola.
tion of Texas statutes.' The Texas Supreme Court held that the
picketing was not unlawful because it had the effect of persuading the railroad employees not to serve the business of the employer who was being picketed. Further, the court held the injunction void as an abridgement of the right of free speech.
The issue of free speech was not raised in the Missouri Pacific
case, but both cases would appear to be correctly decided on the
8 ARK.

CONST. Art. 17, §§ 3, 6.
' ARK. STAT. 1947 ArN. § 73-1105.
5 Ex parte Henry, 147 Tex. 315, 215 S. W. 2d 588 (1948).
6 TEx. REv. CrV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5154f.
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ground that peaceful picketing for a lawful purpose should not
be enjoined because of harm to a third party which is a normal
incident of the picketing. A contrary holding would operate in
many instances to deny a striking union the right of appealing
to the public and, in particular, to other unions. It is, of course,
possible that in a particular case the "incidental" harm resulting
from the picketing might justify a different result, but in the present case it is submitted that the refusal to enjoin picketing because of incidental harm to a stranger was a proper and just
decision.
PEACEFUL PICKETING

TO FURTHER AN UNLAWFUL

CONSPIRACY

Texas. In Best Motor Lines v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America,
Local No. 745,7 Best sought to enjoin picketing of its terminal
by the Union. Best and defendant truck lines each had a labor
contract with the Union, which contracts provided, among other
things, that the employer would not require his employees to go
through the picket line of a striking union. Best and the other
truck lines had made, and were carrying out, contracts as to exchanging and interlining of freight. The Union's representative
presented Best's general manager with a labor contract covering
Best's clerical workers and demanded that he sign it. Best had
never had a labor contract covering clerical workers with this or
any other union. The general manager refused to sign the contract
until the Union furnished proof that it had been certified as the
bargaining agent for the clerks or that a majority of them had
selected the Local to act for it. Thereupon the Union called a strike,
and Best's drivers and dockmen quit working and went on the
picket line.
Best claimed that defendant truck lines, because of the Union's
threats, refused to carry out their exchange and interline con7 --------Tex-._____,
App. 1950).

237 S. W. 2d 589 (1951), rev'g 229 S. W. 2d 912 (Tex. Civ.
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tracts, and Best further said that the Union's acts were done in
furtherance of an unlawful conspiracy. The Union answered that
there was a labor dispute and peaceful picketing for a lawful purpose and that an injunction would abridge its right of free speech.
A temporary injunction was granted but was dissolved by the court
of civil appeals on the ground that no unlawful purpose on the
part of the Union had been made out.
The petition for writ of error presented two points: first, the
Union's picket line was part of a combination in violation of the
Texas anti-trust laws, and, second, the picketing was for an unlawful purpose because it was an attempt to force Best to bargain
with the Union when it apparently represented only a minority of
the clerks. The Texas Supreme Court, in upholding the injunction,
held that labor unions were expressly made subject to the antitrust laws.' Further, it was held that the Union had entered into
an unlawful conspiracy in violation of the antitrade restraint
laws9 and could not use a peaceful picket line in connection with
such an unlawful course of conduct. The court distinguished Ex
parte Henry,'" relied on by the court of civil appeals in dissolving the injunction, in that there was no evidence in the Henry case
of a conspiracy in restraint of trade or proof of intent of the union
to cause third parties to cease doing business with the picketed
employer, whereas the evidence in the Best case clearly showed
this. The court said that while the right of free speech protected
picketing, the element of economic coercion in picketing made it
subject to certain limitations not ordinarily imposed on free speech.
Justice Garwood dissented on the ground that while the injunction was properly granted, modification should be made so as to
enjoin picketing only when it was accompanied by unlawful conduct.
The violations of the anti-trust laws in this case had two aspects:
first, the agreements between the Union and defendant truck lines
8 TE:x. REV. Cv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5154.
)T:x. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 7426, 7428.
10 147 Tex. 315, 215 S. W. 2d 588 (1948).
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not to handle Best's freight, and, second, the agreement among
members of the Union to force Best either to sign the contract or
to quit operating. All of these agreements would seem to fall
under Section 1 of Article 7426 as combinations to create restrictions in trade or commerce; and under Section 3 of the same article as combinations to prevent or lessen competition in transportation of commodities. These agreements would also be violative of Section 3 of Article 7428 as conspiracies against trade,
viz., where two or more persons agree to refuse to transport, deliver, or receive goods of any other person. The fact that defendant carriers were coerced into such agreement by the Union's
threats to call strikes did not detract from the illegality of the
agreements, although this might lay the Union open to another
criminal charge.
The trial court found as a conclusion of law that the Union's
acts and conduct constituted and had the effect of putting into
actual existence and continuation a secondary boycott and a secondary picket line against Best, although neither the civil appeals
court nor the supreme court discussed this point. Courts frequently
refer to secondary picketing and secondary boycotting as though
they were necessarily inseparable, but the Texas statutes define
each.'1 Secondary picketing is defined as "establishing a picket or
pickets at or near the premises of an employer where no labor
dispute.., exists between such employer and employees." The
only picket line in this case was the line around Best's terminal,
and it does not appear that any persons except Best's employees
were in it. It is submitted that had the supreme court given this
question attention, it would not have held that there was secondary
picketing. A secondary boycott is defined as including "any combination , plan, agreement or compact entered into, or any concerted action by two or more persons to cause injury or damage
to any person, firm or corporation for whom they are not employees, by... refusing to handle ... use or work on equipment
11 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5154f, § 2 (d), (e).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6

or supplies of such person, firm or corporation, or interfering with,
or attempting to prevent the free flow of commerce." This definition clearly covers the agreements of the Union with the truck
lines and with its own members.
Any picketing, of course, is likely to have an adverse effect on
the business or trade of the employer being picketed and thus to
a greater or less degree to affect competition. Such a powerful
economic weapon must necessarily be limited in its use, and the
Texas statutes which give to labor unions the right to organize"
and to picket18 are followed immediately by a statute providing
that nothing in these statutes shall diminish the force of enactments against trusts and conspiracies in restraint of trade.' 4 The
Union contended that conduct which amounted to no more than
peaceful picketing could in no sense be regarded as violating the
anti-trust laws. But to adopt this contention would be to render the
last cited article of no effect, as long as the Union's unlawful
plans were carried out by means of peaceful picketing. The evidence clearly established the unlawful course of conduct pursued
by the Union, and it is submitted that the court properly limited
the right of picketing by forbidding its use as an instrument in
carrying out a violation of the law.
The dissenting opinion is very probably correct in asserting
that the picketing itself is not unlawful and that the injunction
should be modified to forbid it only when accompanied by unlawful conduct. However, as Justice Garwood admitted, the decision is susceptible of being given this interpretation, which is
what the majority of the court probably intended.
12 TFx. REv. Civ. STAT.

(Vernon, 1948) art. 5152.
(Vernon, 1948) art. 5153.

13

Thx. REv.

14

TEX. Rv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5154.

CIV. STAT.
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CONSPIRACY

IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE

Texas. In 1951 the Texas Legislature enacted a statute' 5 providing that it should constitute a conspiracy in restraint of trade for
an employer and a union to enter into an agreement whereby an
employee's right to work depends on his membership or non-membership in the union. A 1947 statute 5 had previously declared
void and against public policy any contract requiring of an employee or applicant for employment that he belong or not belong
to a union. The significance of the new statute is that in declaring
a closed shop agreement to be a conspiracy in restraint of trade,
it subjects violators of the statute to fine and imprisonment, whereas the old statute provided for no penalties. Conspiracies in restraint of trade are prohibited and declared to be illegal and unen.
forceable by statute, and the fine recoverable by the State is
$50 to $1500 for each day of violation.'" The Texas Penal Code
defines a conspiracy in restraint of trade in the same words as
does the civil statute, 9 and prescribes a prison sentence of 2 to
10 years for violation. 0
The old statute gave the employer a defense to an action for
breach of a union or closed shop contract as well as a forceful
argument against it in collective bargaining negotiations. But it
did not operate as a deterrent to the making of such agreements,
which, to a large extent, were carried out. It is felt that the new
statute, by subjecting both contracting parties to punishment, will
have a powerful effect in preventing union and closed shop agreements from coming into existence.

Richard B. Perrenot.
15 Tx. Rav.
16 TEx. REV.
17 Tax. REV.
isTx. Ray.

CIv.
Civ.
Civ.
Civ.

STAT. (Vernon, 1952 Supp.) art. 7428- 1.
STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 5207a.
STAT.

(Vernon, 1948) art. 7429.

STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 7436.
19 Tx. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) art. 1634.
20 Tax. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) art. 1635.

